Use of Munich analogy invariably misleads because it gets history wrong and overestimates current threats
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Unfortunately, invocations of the Munich analogy almost invariably mislead because they distort the true nature of appeasement, ignore the extreme rarity of the Nazi German threat, and falsely suggest that Britain and France could have readily stopped Hitler prior to 1939. Additionally, the Munich analogy reinforces the presidential tendency since 1945 to overstate threats for the purpose of rallying public and congressional support, and overstated threats encourage resort to force in circumstances where alternatives might better serve long-term US security interests. Threats that are in fact limited—as was Baathist Iraq after the 9/11 attacks—tend to be portrayed in Manichaean terms, thus skewing the policy choice toward military action, including preventive war with all its attendant risks and penalties. If the 1930s reveal the danger of underestimating a security threat, the post-World War II decades and post-9/11 years contain examples of the danger of overestimating such threats.
The frequent invocation of the 1938 Munich agreement between Hitler and Chamberlin in the debate over the nuclear deal with Iran not only is inappropriate because the threat from a nuclear Iran is nowhere near comparable to the threat from Nazi Germany, but also gets critical historical facts about the situation leading up to the Munich agreement wrong.