Iran will not collapse because of decreased revenues; it survived a similar situation in the 1980s and will, no doubt, try to make a virtue out of necessity by appealing to the revolutionary spirit while blaming sanctions and foreign enemies for any difficulties. It is likely, however, that Ahmadinejad's policies of confronting the international community, supporting resistance forces, throwing money at problems against specialist advice and making populist promises of improved living standards will face increased domestic criticism. The opportunity costs of funding insurgents and militias may become more controversial. After all, by all accounts the Iranian street is no fan of these policies. Some believe that economic constraints will hamper Iran's regional ambitions. Ahmadinejad's economic and political model may be discredited, especially if a new round of meaningful sanctions is imposed in the first half of 2009. At the very least, economic constraints should encourage a domestic debate about what kind of regional role Iran should play, and at what cost.