A Better Deal for Iran
Dalia Dassa Kaye argues that congressional rejection of the nuclear deal with Iran would mean that key partners would likely abandon the sanctions regime, allowing Iran to reap the benefits of sanctions relief without having to abide by any of the nuclear restrictions. She concludes that if "anyone is going to get a better deal than the one being debated today, it would likely be Iran,"
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So to summarize the practical effects of a congressional rejection based on political and diplomatic realities, Iran would get to reap some of the economic benefits of the rejected deal while paying a much lower price in nuclear restrictions. To be sure, Iran won't gain as much as it would if the JCPOA were implemented, and it would not gain the big prize of European investment in the Iranian economy. But Iran would still get benefits from resumed normalized trade with other key world economies outside the West. That's not optimal for Iran, but it's not a bad plan B, especially considering Iran would not face any serious constraints on the expansion of its civilian nuclear program outside the limitations of the NPT.
The critics of the Iran deal may be right that rejecting the deal won't necessarily bring about a war with Iran tomorrow, although the potential for conflict escalation will be higher with the breakdown of U.S.-Iranian engagement and communication. Periods of high political tension in the past have led to dangerous standoffs between Iranian and U.S. naval forces in the Gulf waters and particularly the Strait of Hormuz, for example.
It is critical for lawmakers to understand there will be serious consequences for rejecting the Iran deal. And those consequences look a lot worse for the United States and its partners than for Iran. If anyone is going to get a better deal than the one being debated today, it would likely be Iran, not the United States.
For one, this argument presumes that Iran's calculations won't fundamentally alter in response to a congressional rejection. But if Congress rejects the deal, Iran would have no incentive to take the steps required by the JCPOA because it would automatically be facing the continuation of secondary U.S. sanctions. The resolution of disapproval pending in Congress is written explicitly to deny the president the ability to waive U.S. sanctions against firms doing business with Iran. With U.S. secondary sanctions in place following the congressional rejection, why would Iran start dismantling its program and wait on even more demanding requirements from the United States and Europe?
Furthermore, European firms would not risk re-entering the Iranian market with secondary sanctions in place because, as lucrative as investments in Iran might be, most European firms would not jeopardize business with the United States for business with Iran. So critics of the deal are right—sanctions would remain in place, but Iran would have zero incentive (or requirements) to restrict its nuclear program as mandated by the JCPOA. It could simply return to its dangerous pre-interim agreement centrifuge numbers and enrichment levels because it would face sanctions from the United States and Europe either way.
While none of the P5+1 countries (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany) wants to see a nuclear-armed Iran, they are certainly not going to carry the same expectations as the United States Congress as to what constitutes sufficient Iranian concessions for a “good” deal. They already supported a deal that was good enough for them and good enough for Iran. The toughest restrictions in the Vienna deal were not being pushed by China or Russia—they were included because of American and European concerns, which kept Israeli interests in mind much more than the non-Western parties. Russia and China may also develop different interpretations of United Nations Security Council resolutions restricting trade with Iran in an environment where the United States rejected a diplomatic deal accepted by most of the rest of the world and Iran.
So the practical result of a congressional rejection would be that Iran would likely resume trade with these key powers while not being bound by the extensive restrictions and intrusive inspections required by the JCPOA. Is the United States really ready to add a new trade war with China to its bilateral agenda by penalizing companies doing business with Iran after it was the United States that walked away from the deal.
If the U.S. congress rejects the nuclear deal with Iran, it will have multiple negative reprecussions for U.S. interests and security. The most likely impact of U.S. rejection of the deal will be a gradual collapse of the sanctions regime as our partners have no interest in reopening negotiations with Iran and are already starting to renew trade relations. Additionally, rejection of the deal will damage U.S. credibility as a global leader and its diplomatic capital for many years as the U.S. was critical in forming the consensus for the deal in the first place.
- Backing away from the deal now would empower hardliners and doom prospects for democratic reform
- Rejection of the deal would damage U.S. leadership in Middle East at a critical time
- Partisian vote against Iranian nuclear deal would damage our allies confidence in U.S. leadership
- Abandoning the deal and increasing pressure on Iran would backfire with our partners abandoning the negotiations and Iran free to pursue a nuclear weapon
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