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The unanticipated US military strikes in Syria have opened a new chapter in the conflict that could eliminate disagreements between Iran and Russia regarding the future of Syria.
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Donald Trump as president will be positioned to swiftly pull the U.S. out of the Obama administration’s landmark nuclear agreement with Iran, as he suggested during his campaign. A much harder task for Mr. Trump, however, is to convince other global powers to join him and dismantle a deal that President Barack Obama says has diminished the threat of another war in the Mideast and opened a path for reduced tensions in the region.
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The United States, Russia and China are now aggressively pursuing a new generation of smaller, less destructive nuclear weapons. The buildups threaten to revive a Cold War-era arms race and unsettle the balance of destructive force among nations that has kept the nuclear peace for more than a half-century.
[ More ]While all eyes are on Vladimir Putin’s machinations in Syria, deploying Russian fighters and troops, a potentially more dangerous Moscow effort in Iran is picking up steam. Media outlets are reporting that Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems may be delivered before the end of the year.
[ More ]Moscow and Tehran are doing everything possible to quickly sign an agreement on the removal of enriched uranium from Iran, the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department on Arms Control said.
[ More ]A prospective lifting of sanctions on Iran may bring economic benefit to its neighbors in the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Yet this cannot offset the region's deep-seated weaknesses, from ethnic tension to government corruption to substantial poverty.
[ More ]For a man often portrayed in the West as the swaggering bully leader of a renegade state, in need of containment and isolation, President Vladimir V. Putin has spent the last few days asserting himself at the center of international diplomacy — even receiving surprising credit from President Obama for his help in securing Tuesday’s landmark accord to contain Iran’s nuclear program.
[ More ]As Iran and six world powers edge closer to solidifying an accord that puts limits on Tehran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief, a unique opportunity presents itself for the West. The United States and its European partners could begin to decouple the unnatural Iranian-Russian alliance to reign in Moscow’s hegemonic ambitions, as well as bring Iran back into the global economic fold. Competition between Moscow and Tehran would reduce Russia’s influence in the Middle East, unlock Iran and may even serve Europe’s future interest as it looks for alternatives to Russian gas.
[ More ]Iran’s military will gain powerful new conventional weapons in a nuclear deal if Russia has its way, making it tougher than ever for President Barack Obama to sell an accord to an already skeptical Congress.
[ More ]Saudi Arabia and Russia have just signed a $10 billion investment deal, possibly indicating closer ties between the two countries in response to the shifting dynamics of the nuclear deal with Iran.
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Another mistake the United States made was failing to get Russia on its side. Iran cannot be politically and economically isolated without Russia fully cooperating for three reasons. First, Russia has widespread economic ties with Iran. Second, the two rising powers, China and India, refrain from participating in sanctions on Iran because both have interests in the country. Yet, both tend to hide behind Russia at the UN and other forums. As long as Russia does not join sanctions against Iran, China and India will not either, despite U.S. pressure to do so. European countries, such as France and Italy, also feel that halting their investments in Iran will be impractical.Without Russia, therefore, the United States will have little success. And third, Russia is the supplier of the nuclear reactor in Bushehr, indicating that Iran needs to continue ties with Russia.
Meanwhile, Russia will continue to use the P-5 diplomatic process (in side and outside the UN) to push forth compromise proposals that in volve enriching and/or storing fuel on Russian soil as a way to give Iran a symbolic claim to autonomy but also giving the West what it wants on nonproliferation. As part of such a strategy, it will still oppose tougher, “crippling” sanctions toward Iran in the P-5 diplomatic process as part of a larger position that honestly does not consider a heavily monitored, conditioned enrichment program to be a strategic threat (i.e., Russia will continue acting on its analysis that “zero enrichment” is not feasible and, in terms of curtailing threats, is not even needed). More expansively, in terms of geopolitics beyond the nuclear portfolio, Russia can be expected to continue to curtail US and NATO geopolitical and geostrategic influence by cooperating with Iran (as well as China) on Caspian Sea, Central Asian, Caucasus, and South Asian issues. It will undoubtedly increase strong bilateral trade links with Tehran, providing Iran with consumer goods, foodstuffs, and oil and gas equipment as well as assistance on infra structural projects. In the Gulf conventional military context, it will keep supplying important niche military defense capabilities such as ballistic missile technology and contracts for a range of jet fighters, helicopters, submarines, tanks, and air-defense missile systems to Iran. Finally, the delays caused by Stuxnet aside, Russia will help run, maintain, and service the Bushehr nuclear power reactor as a part of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure that does not pose the most serious danger of weaponization, including supply of needed feedstock.27
The position of Russia and China, two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, is that they will impose only those sanctions required by U.N. Security Council resolutions. Russia earns significant revenues from large projects in Iran, such as the Bushehr nuclear reactor, and it also seeks not to provoke Iran into supporting Islamist movements in the Muslim regions of Russia and the Central Asian states.
In August 2014, the two countries reportedly agreed to a broad trade and energy deal which might include an exchange of Iranian oil (500,000 barrels per day) for Russian goods. That deal could potentially violate the JPA, if implemented.32 Russia is an oil exporter, but Iranian oil that Russia might buy under this arrangement would presumably free up additional Russian oil for export. Russia and Iran reaffirmed the deal in April 2015, following the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord. Also in April 2015, Russia lifted its own ban on delivering the S-300 air defense system that it sold Iran in 2007 but refused to deliver after Resolution 1929 was adopted—even though that Resolution would technically not bar supply of that defensive system. The Russian announcements in April appeared part of an effort to ensure that Russia has an advantage in access to Iranian markets if sanctions are lifted as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal.
The deal has the potential to further increase tensions between the United States and Russia by reducing the importance of one of the few areas where Russia and the United States have construc- tively cooperated in recent years. Russian support was essential for passing U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1929, which became a central component of the international sanctions regime.58 And throughout the nuclear negotiations, the Russians have played a generally supportive role.
With the nuclear issue playing a less prominent role, Russia will be able to increase its cooperation with Iran on regional matters such as support for Bashar al-Assad. Tensions are already increasing; for example, the Russians have announced the controversial sale of S-300 missile systems to Iran, which while not eliminating American or Israeli abilities to militarily threaten Iran’s nuclear facili- ties would certainly complicate any operation.59 This on again and off again sale has been in the works for years and was rescinded by the Russians in 2010 after UNSCR 1929 passed. The Russians have not yet announced a delivery date, and it could be years before the Iranians get the S-300. It is also possible that the threat of the sale is not about Iran at all but is meant as a leverage point for the Russians with the United States, which in the past has expended significant diplomatic capital convincing the Russians to cancel it.
A nuclear agreement that lifts the sanctions on Iran’s oil industry and returns roughly 1 million barrels per day of oil to the market is likely to shake a Russian economy already ravaged by low oil prices and Western sanctions in response to Russian actions in Ukraine.50 The Russian Central Bank estimates that the cost of the Iran deal for Russia’s energy industry could be as high as $27 billion.51 Some experts have estimated that the return of Iranian oil to the market could cause an additional $15 per barrel drop in the price of oil and prolong the current period of low oil prices.52 This could result in additional economic strain on Russia and assist U.S. efforts to pressure Russia to change course in Ukraine.
However, there is the danger that if not properly cali- brated, reduced oil prices brought on by the return of Iranian oil to the market could go too far in weaken- ing Russia’s position and cause an economic collapse in Russia, with the danger of financial contagion flowing into Europe, Asia, and the United States. Such a scenario may have the opposite of the desired effect on Putin’s behavior, causing him to lash out in an even more aggressive and risky manner instead of bending to international pressure.
Russia has a significant strategic and economic relationship with Iran that it is trying to maintain after the nuclear deal. To begin with, Russia has been a significant military and economic partner with Iran, providing nuclear power expertise and selling weapons to Iran. Russia supports the current sanctions regime but is looking forward to its expiration. In addition, Russia has long looked to use Iran to counter-balance against the U.S. in the Middle East while at the same time not antagonizing Iran to escalate its support for Islamic militants in Russian territories.