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Here, the news is bad. Whatever the JCPOA does in terms of the nuclear program, when it comes to the conventional balance in the region the JCPOA appears to strengthen Iran. The end of sanctions does not just result in a “windfall” gain to Iran as frozen assets are released; it also adds substantial and growing amounts to Iran’s national income as normal trade relations resume, as Iranian oil production expands, and as access to markets for new technology and spare parts increases the productivity of Iranian society. In the short term this means that Iran will have more money with which to support regional allies like the Assad regime in Damascus; in the medium term as conventional weapons restrictions are lifted Iran will have the opportunity to strengthen both defensive and offensive arms capabilities; in the medium to long term Iran’s greater economic clout will substantially increase its political weight both in the region and in world affairs, giving it new allies and making a return to sanctions and isolation increasingly unlikely.
These worries loom larger because Iran, under sanctions and suffering serious economic privation, has nevertheless been able to operate effectively in regional politics, scoring gains against Sunni adversaries that have seriously alarmed some of its neighbors. If an isolated and economically challenged Iran could achieve such results, one must ask what it can achieve under the more favorable conditions that will follow the implementation of the JCPOA.
It is worth noting in this context that many of Iran’s neighbors do not share the Obama Administration’s view that the greatest danger from Iran flows from its nuclear program. Rather, the fear is that Iran’s large population, sectarian fervor and powerful security institutions make it potentially the most powerful state in the region and a threat to the security of its neighbors. For many Saudis in particular, whose close ties to Pakistan’s security establishment give them confidence that an Iranian nuclear weapon could be offset by the existence of the Pakistani arsenal, the nuclear program in Iran is much less threatening than Iran’s apparent ability and willingness to support militias, rebels and Iran‐aligned governments across the region.
The misconception that the most recent Iran nuclear deal is an insufficient alternative to the multilateral sanctions to which Iran has been subjected is another common misperception promoted by news organizations and politicians. In order to understand just how effective the nuclear deal will be compared to previous sanctions, it is essential to know the goals of the sanctions and how well those were met. One of the scenarios that the United States and its allied countries had in mind when instituting sanctions against Iran was essentially to bleed the country dry and prevent any further nuclear proliferation by cutting off funds. If sanctions were in place long enough, there would be no choice but for Iranian leaders, seeing the destitute state of their people, to halt their nuclear progress. But even if this scenario did not play out, proponents still thought the sanctions could work. They believed that if the Iranian government did not give in to U.S. demands, the general public would. Driven to horrible poverty by the sanctions, Iranian citizens would revolt against their unyielding government and nuclear proliferation would be halted.
Neither of these situations panned out; Iranian leaders continued with nuclear proliferation, despite the country’s increasing poverty, and the Iranian people saw the United States as the one to blame—not their government. However, sanctions did have success in their primary goal, one separate from these two scenarios: bringing Iran to the negotiating table. But it’s crucial to recognize that if continued, sanctions would augment Iranian nuclear proliferation more than the new nuclear deal ever could by making leaders double down in their efforts to gain a bargaining chip against the United States.
By focusing on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s vehement criticisms of the deal, American politicians have grossly exaggerated Israel’s disapproval for the Iran nuclear deal. The Israeli government is made up of others who realize that although not preferable, the Iran nuclear deal is not enough for the country to sever its relationship with the United States. Various former Israeli security heads voiced their support for the nuclear deal, despite their less than positive views of Iran. The viewpoint supported by many in Israel was articulated perfectly by Major-General Israel Ziv, former head of the Israeli army’s Operations Directorate Branch. He stated that, “this agreement is the best among all other alternatives, and any military strike—as successful as it may be—would not have delayed even 20 percent of what the agreement will delay, not to mention the risk of another flare-up with Hezbollah, which an operation against Iran would have generated. The agreement is an established fact, and it’s not particularly bad as far as Israel is concerned.”
Even amongst Israeli disapproval, the American-Israeli relationship is astonishingly strong, presenting little chance of it crumbling under the pressure of strained relations because of the deal. Both countries are so interdependent in security and foreign policy matters that there is no way the United States could lose its strategic alliance with Israel.
As demonstrations of Iranian intentions, those events were invaluable to the United States, which began a renewed and ultimately successful push to get the European Union to finally ban Hezbollah’s military wing. No genuinely spectacular plots emerged; the combination of intelligence successes against Iranian terrorists and the initiation of serious negotiations seems to have convinced Tehran to desist — another demonstration that the United States can handle Iranian malfeasance in this area.
Whether the plots are inept or not, there is no excusing the Islamic Republic’s guilt. But in gauging the potential threat of a revived campaign of Iranian terror, it’s worth remembering that state-sponsored terrorism of the kind Iran has practiced is not the catastrophic terrorism of al Qaeda and its jihadi followers. Instead of seeking to kill on the grand scale, Iran’s terrorist attacks have always been smaller and carefully calibrated so that its enemies would not use these attacks as justification for military reprisal or retributive war. It has typically sought deniability, which is at least in part also a function of scale. There is a reason administrations of both parties did not consider terrorism a top-tier issue until 9/11, when actors like al Qaeda, which had no state sponsors to restrain them, shifted the paradigm of modern terrorism.
Washington can use diplomatic persuasion and U.S. financial sanctions to keep European businesses out of Iran. If U.S. sanctions remain in place, few European banks will risk penalties or their ability to transact in dollars by re-entering the Iranian market. Even if Europe and other countries lift all their sanctions, Washington could revert to a pre-2010 dynamic in which Washington imposed unilateral sanctions and presented foreign companies with a choice of doing business in the United States or Iran. That was still a period of intense sanctions pressure on Iran as Treasury used designations of key Iranian economy actors and sustained outreach to the international business community to persuade financial institutions and major companies to cut their business ties with Iran. Washington would have difficult conversations with its allies about sanctions enforcement. Given the power of U.S. markets and the dominance of the U.S. dollar, however, which continue to demonstrate their global attractiveness as Chinese growth de-accelerates and international investors seek American market opportunities and dollar-denominated safe havens, most important foreign companies are likely to keep Iran at arm’s length.
The JCPOA does not effectively and permanently block Iran’s multiple pathways to a nuclear weapons capability. Rather, it offers Iran a patient path. If Iran abides by the terms of the agreement, it can emerge in 10 to 15 years with a massive nuclear program, a short path to a nuclear bomb, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a strong economy immunized against sanctions pressure. Specific terms of the current JCPOA, therefore, should be renegotiated such that the final agreement prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
Through a joint resolution of disapproval of the JCPOA, Congress can help the Obama administration and its successor negotiate and enforce a stronger nuclear agreement. In doing so, this Congress would be following a proud tradition of legislators who have rejected or insisted on amendments to more than 300 bilateral and multilateral treaties and international agreements, including major arms-control agreements reached with the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War—at a far more dangerous time against a more menacing enemy who had thousands of nuclear tipped missiles aimed at American cities.
In this most likely scenario, after a congressional vote of disapproval, Iran could decide to implement certain nuclear commitments but choose not to implement others, thus creating diplomatic ambiguity among the P5+1. During the interim negotiations, Iran failed to implement certain commitments,35 possibly violated others,36 continued attempts to illicitly procure nuclear goods,37 and evade sanctions38 (including 10 days after the JCPOA signing, when Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani traveled to Russia in defiance of a U.N. Security Council travel ban39).
Should Iran implement certain nuclear commitments but choose not to implement others, especially commitments to cooperate with IAEA inspections and the resolution of concerns regarding the possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s program, diplomatic pressure on the United States would intensify. Iran’s compliance with certain commitments might still trigger U.N. and EU sanctions relief, which could sow confusion about P5+1 policy. Iran would also likely try to exploit this uncertainty to divide Russia and China from the West, and Europe from the United States.
If past is prologue, even under the scenario in which Iran walks away from the JCPOA, Iran will likely escalate its nuclear program only incrementally not aggressively so as to avoid crippling economic sanctions or military strikes. Despite Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s statement that if the West does not provide Iran with the nuclear deal it wants, Iran “will go back to the old path, stronger than what they [the West] can imagine,”27 Iran has historically moved cautiously.
For example, between 2008 and 2013, Iran only increased its operating centrifuges by an average of about 1,000 per year at the Natanz facility.28 During this five-year period, during which sanctions on Iran escalated significantly, Iran’s nuclear program expanded incrementally, as demonstrated in the chart above.29
While the increases over the five year period were concerning, Tehran was careful not to engage in massive nuclear escalation that could trigger more crippling economic sanctions or military strikes. Based on this history, it is reasonable to expect Iran to maintain this careful policy even if it walks away from the current deal and refuses to renegotiate based on Congress’ required amendments. Indeed, the risks are the same. A rapid breakout by Iran would likely lead to a military response, as presidents from both parties have repeatedly pledged to use military force if necessary to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. Iran knows that it would ultimately lose such a war.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated between the P5+1 and Iran places termlimited constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of many of the most impactful global sanctions. However, the deal contains structural flaws that enable Iran to:
- Expand the pathways to a nuclear weapon, access to heavy weaponry, and ballistic missile technology during the duration of the agreement as a result of a series of sunset clauses;
- Build economic resiliency against sanctions pressure, diminishing Western leverage to address non-compliance and enforcement; and,
- Walk away from the agreement if members of the P5+1 attempt either to re-impose sanctions in a socalled “snapback” sanctions scenario or to impose non-nuclear related sanctions in response to Iran’s other illicit activities.
The sunset clauses—the fatal flaw of the JCPOA— permit critical nuclear, arms, and ballistic missile restrictions to disappear over a five- to 15-year period. Tehran must simply abide by the agreement to soon emerge as a threshold nuclear power with an industrial-size enrichment program. Similarly, it must only hang tight to reach near-zero breakout time; find a clandestine sneak-out pathway powered by easierto- hide advanced centrifuges; build an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles; gain access to heavy weaponry like more sophisticated combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and battle tanks after the lifting of the U.N. conventional arms embargo after five years; and develop an economy increasingly immunized against future sanctions pressure. Iran can achieve all this without violating the agreement by simply waiting for the sunset dates to be reached. By cheating Tehran will only get there faster, for example, if it refuses to grant the IAEA physical access to suspicious sites and Washington can’t get European support to punish Iranian stonewalling.
There is significant precedent in American history for Congress and the White House to work together to renegotiate the terms of an international treaty or a non-binding agreement. Throughout American history, Congress has rejected or required amendments to more than 300 treaties and international agreements (of which about 80 were multilateral).8 This includes major bilateral and multilateral arms control and nuclear agreements during and after the Cold War. Our colleague at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Orde Kittrie, professor of law at Arizona State University and former lead attorney for nuclear affairs at the State Department, has studied the issue of congressional review of international agreements. His research found that presidents may argue that “the slightest change [to an agreement] … would unbalance the package and kill the treaty,” but that this has not been true in a vast majority of cases.9
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