Evidence: Recently Added

Many US politicans are skeptical of Iran’s fears of another war, claiming that the example of the Iran-Iraq War—which lasted from 1980 to 1988—is an excuse designed to mask Iran’s aggressive behavior. Yet from practically infancy, Iranians are taught the traumatic effects of this war. Oral histories about the Iran-Iraq War have been passed down to children from grandparents and parents; add rhetoric from the government, and ubiquitous memorials around Tehran and the rest of the country, and it’s not hard to understand why the fear of war is embedded in Iranian culture and consciousness. Iran does not want to be caught unprepared for another war and suffer the way it did in the 1980s. Publicizing Iran’s missile program not only assuages public fears but also has a deterrent effect on the country’s enemies.

The Shiite-Sunni clashes in the region seem to be getting graver every day. In particular, Iran’s reaction to the recent execution of Shiite cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia is a clear example of the existing cultural and religious tension, and its potential for rapid growth. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei referred to Saudi Arabia’s execution as “Daesh-like action” that will not be tolerated. Publicizing Iran’s capabilities and the country’s determination to continue ballistic missile production might be an Iranian attempt to dissuade other regional powers from exercising too much power in the region, particularly when Iranian interests and the existence of the Iranian regime are threatened.

The destruction of the Osiraq reactor did not delay the development of a nuclear weapons option because it was never intended to be part of such an effort. The French-supplied facility was subject to rigorous safeguards and designed to ensure that Iraq would not be able to produce weapons-grade plutonium. An examination of the reactor by Harvard physicist Richard Wilson after the attack concluded that the facility was not suited for production of weapons-grade plutonium. As a result, the attack did not reduce the risk that Iraq would develop nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it brought about a far more determined and focused effort to acquire nuclear weapons.

Why, then, did Iraq still fail to acquire nuclear weapons? The nuclear weapons program failed as a result of sub-optimal technological choices and poor management. These slip-ups had nothing to do with the Israeli strike. Instead they reflected a non-meritocratic bureaucratic culture, office politics, and bad judgement.

First, the culture of fear in Saddam's Iraq produced inefficient management and led scientists to fear admitting failure. Thus, unproductive projects continued longer than they should have. Second, by opting for inefficient and outdated technologies the isotope separation project failed spectacularly and caused years of delay. Had the Iraqis opted for more efficient technologies from the outset and not been constrained by the regime's excessive security concerns they would have made much greater progress during the first five years of the program.

But, the sanctions relief provided by the United States does not equate with unilateral sanctions disarmament. The United States retains a number of sanctions authorities that will continue to damage Iran’s ability to engage in terrorism financing, as well as to exact consequences for violations of Iranian human rights and other destabilizing activities. This includes the all-too-important tool of secondary sanctions through the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act or CISADA. With this tool, the United States will still be able to pressure banks and companies against doing business with the IRGC, Qods Force, Qassem Solemani, and Iran’s military and missile forces. The EU and UN decisions to remove some of these entities from their own sanctions list is therefore important to Iran mainly as a symbolic step; practically, these entities and individuals will find their international business activities stymied due to the centrality of the United States in global finance until they correct their own behavior in the eyes of the United States.

Moreover, the United States will retain its ability to impose sanctions on entities and individuals trading with Iran in conventional arms and ballistic missiles, even after UN restrictions in this regard lapse in 5 and 8 years respectively. The UN’s provisions were important in terms of setting international approval and backstopping for U.S. unilateral efforts. But, they were conditioned, even as early as 2006 and 2007, on Iran’s failure to fulfill its nuclear obligations. Even the earliest UNSC resolutions laid out a package in which these sanctions would be terminated when Iran satisfied the P5+1 and IAEA on the nuclear issue. Further, it is the consequence of U.S. sanctions on these targets that can best deter bad behavior. Similarly, international export controls governing transfers of these types will remain fully in force.

Since the international community intensified sanctions against Iran in 2010, Iran has only grown more desperate. For example, the country’s oil sector now needs anywhere from $50 to $100 billion in investment to improve production, a point that Iranian officials, including Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, have emphasized repeatedly over the past two years. External investment was cut off by sanctions, and Iran has not had the spare capital to maintain, much less improve, its facilities. Nor has it enjoyed access to new technologies that could enhance oil field productivity.

Oil is, of course, only one part of Iran’s economy, which includes struggling industries like automobile and domestic manufacturing. To avoid an over-dependence on global oil markets, Iran has also made it state policy to build a diversified export economy. Given the prevailing low global oil prices, Iran is likely to continue trying to strengthen other sectors to maximize its growth potential and limit its vulnerability to an uncertain market.

Lest observers assume that Iran would have turned its entire economy into a terrorism-financing machine if only it had the money, consider the fact that the most intensive sanctions on the country are only 3 years old. Before January 2012, oil sales were bringing in nearly $88 billion a year, money that Tehran largely spent as any government would: on domestic priorities — not solely to back anti Western interests. If the LA Times is to believed, this is a conclusion that CIA has itself reached.

As with the effort to wean its economy off oil, Iran has also sought to reduce costly subsidies on everything from food, to housing, to energy, in order to improve the economy’s efficiency, reduce waste, and spur competitiveness. But sanctions targeting Iranian oil revenues hampered that effort, as the country lacked the hard currency — and political will — to forge ahead with subsidy reform, at least until Rouhani’s election. It is now struggling to complete this project, one that sanctions relief would undoubtedly boost by providing Iran with fresh revenue and reducing its citizens’ dependence on government handouts. This is particularly important for Rouhani, who will be looking to shore up domestic support in the run-up to parliamentary elections in February 2016 and to win reelection in 2017.