South Korea and other states could demand same rights to enrich Uranium that Iran is getting in nuclear deal
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Acquiescing to a latent nuclear Iran would be a major exception to this longstanding policy and would risk undermining decades of nonproliferation efforts. This danger would be most severe if the international community formally recognized and enshrined Iran’s enrichment capability in a comprehensive nuclear deal, but its effects would still be present in any scenario in which Iran maintains an indigenous enrichment capability. Other countries will demand similar rights and capabilities and cite Iran as a precedent. South Korea might intensify its calls for indigenous reprocessing, and the United Arab Emirates might renege on its commitments in its “gold standard” agreement. It will be difficult if not impossible for Washington to claim that it trusts Tehran’s leaders with sensitive nuclear technology but not its own friends and allies.
Acquiescing to the Iranian nuclear deal would reverse the decades long U.S. nonproliferation strategy of attempting to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear technology by allowing Iran to retain the ability to enrich uranium. The likely consequence of the completion of the deal is that other countries will demand the same capability, including Saudi Arabia.