Fallback options would confer legitimacy on an enrichment programme that the Security Council had, after great effort, officially delegitimised, unanimously and with successive reinforcement in the form of four Chapter VII resolutions. Once conferred, this legitimacy would not be reversible, and even to make the offer would be to acknowledge the right to enrichment. Under a fallback deal, Security Council sanctions would fall away and international enterprises would resume business with Iran. The reimposition of financial pressure if Iran reneged on an agreement would be neither certain nor quick. The undermining of the logic and authority of the five Security Council resolutions to date that mandated full suspension is not an insignificant price to pay for an uncertain bet on a fallback scenario. Pierre Goldschmidt notes that without the Security Council requirement for full suspension under Chapter VII, it would not be illegal for Iran to produce weapons-grade HEU, even if there were no apparent civilian use for it. In the event of a fallback scenario, the Council would thus need at a minimum to specify the limits of the allowable enrichment capacity and the corresponding activity, but agreeing on such limits would be a time-consuming task.