A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean and What can be Done?

The first reason concerns Iran's motives. As far as can be judged, Iran's basic motives for striving to obtain nuclear weapons are defense and deterrence. Iran initially decided to develop nuclear weapons capability in the second half of the 1980s, apparently as a counterweight to Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, especially because of the severe blow that Iran suffered in its war with Iraq. The Iranians were primarily concerned about the fact that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons and missiles with a range covering Tehran and other Iranian cities. Iraq had already used chemical weapons and missiles against Iranian targets, and was on its way to obtaining nuclear weapons. Later, after Iraq was weakened in the Gulf War, the Iranian regime's nuclear ambitions were motivated by its increasing drive to deter the US from using its strategic capabilities against it. The Iranian regime also has an interest in deterring Israel from attacking the Iranian nuclear facilities. Apparently, however, the belief that Israel has nuclear weapons did not play an important role in Iran's decision to develop such weapons itself.Meanwhile, there is no reason to assume that any change has taken place in the dominant role played by defense and deterrence in Iran's considerations. In contrast to Saddam Hussein's regime, the Iranian Islamic regime has so far shown no inclination for risky adventures. Yet if and when Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it cannot be ruled out that these considerations could change. Its inclination to weigh its policy carefully might wane, and aggressive impulses against Israel might become more influential. It can be posited, however, that like other countries that have obtained nuclear weapons, these weapons will be considered a last resort, to be used only in case of an extreme and immediate strategic danger. Iran apparently does not consider Israel a country that constitutes this degree of danger. Iran's wish to destroy Israel is not a supreme interest justifying use of nuclear weapons at any price in order to realize it.

In 1981, Israel chose to attack the Iraqi nuclear reactor by means of an air strike. In early 2006, former IDF chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon indicated that in addition to an air strike, Israel possessed a number of other options for military action in Iran. Indeed, while the most frequently discussed option is an aerial attack, an air strike against Iranian nuclear facilities would inevitably be problematic and occur under difficult conditions. Although American and Israeli operational capabilities to attack the Iranian facilities from the air have improved significantly over the past twenty-five years, Iranian nuclear facilities are 1,200-1,500 kilometers from Israel, much further away than the Iraqi reactor. The distance could be even longer if the planes need to bypass Jordanian airspace to avoid a crisis in Israeli-Jordanian relations, or refrain from flying over Iraq if the operation is not coordinated with the United States and as such take an alternative route via the Indian Ocean. In order to travel such distances, the Israeli planes would need to refuel in mid-flight twice, once on the way to their targets and once on the way back. This in turn would make the operation even more complicated, due to the vulnerability of the fuel planes. Moreover, the Iranian facilities are carefully sheltered, with some located deep underground, and are well protected by air defenses and interceptor planes. All this will require that the attack be carried out by a relatively large force, including attack planes, interceptors planes, fuel planes, and additional supporting aircraft, all of which would be vulnerable to interference and mishaps.

In effect, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the main countries likely to have an important reason for joining the nuclear arms race. Saudi Arabia may be particularly sensitive to Iranian aggression, owing to concern about the stability of its regime and the future of its oil reserves. At present, Saudi Arabia lacks a suitable technological infrastructure for nuclear weapons and it is likely to prefer relying on American backing. However, Saudi Arabia may exploit its financial capabilities to try to obtain nuclear capability at a later stage. Iran does not directly threaten Egypt, but as a leading country in the region, Egypt will find it difficult to stand aloof while Iran and Israel are on the nuclear track. Syria too might embrace a nuclear route as the preferred method of deterrence against Israel; it might improve its military capabilities and regional posture, and thereby aim for Iranian nuclear assistance. In short, Iranian nuclear capability will not necessarily constitute a direct motive for most affected countries in the region to enter the nuclear race, and they will face heavy international pressure to refrain from doing so. If, however, an Arab country such as Egypt decides to do so, it is liable to prompt other countries to follow the same route. The fact that several Arab governments announced in the fall of 2006 that they intend to develop a nuclear capability - albeit for peaceful needs - might be a first indication of such a scenario.

Third, a nuclear capacity will reinforce Iran's status as the backbone of radical elements worldwide, particularly in the Muslim world. Obtaining nuclear weapons is liable to strengthen the radical tendency within Iran, at least in the short term, and increase the regime's prestige. It may impel moderate regimes in the region to adapt their policy to Iran, as they will be more exposed to Iranian pressure, even if some of them, mostly those in the Gulf, try to increase their reliance on the US as a counterweight to the Iranian threat. Iran's stature is liable to increase; indeed, since the weakening and fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, there is no regional player that can balance and contain Iran in the Gulf region. And, the Iranian regime may wave the banner of its nuclear weapons to bolster its struggle against the US over influenceand control in the Gulf. The strengthening of radical elements is liable to harm the peaceful relationships that Israel is trying to build with the Arab and Muslim world.