Testimony of Scott Modell: Regional Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran
Quicktabs: Citation
A nuclear deal with Iran will bring in hundreds of billions of dollars as Iran recoups frozen assets, exports more oil, takes in foreign direct investment, enters into trade agreements, and starts to shrug off its pariah status. Yet, the strategic calculus of the Supreme Leader and much of the ruling conservative establishment is the same today as it was when the Islamic Revolution began: preserving the regime at home and deterring threats from abroad, while externalizing the revolution and resistance. The Iran Threat Network, free of budgetary constraints and emboldened as a newly-minted nuclear power, is the engine of the regime and will resume Iran’s pursuit of broader goals in the region. Look for a return to past levels of activity by elements of the Iran Threat Network, including units of the Qods Force, whose budgets have been cut back as a result of Iran’s economic downturn. This means more operations in Syria, where Iran will continue to work closely with the Assad regime and Iran-trained, equipped, and guided militant networks; further attempts to support Shia activism in Bahrain, where Iran has attempted several times to create the conditions for regime change; continued use of Iraq as a transit point for illicit commerce coming from the Gulf, and the movement of men, money, and illicit materiel across the Levant; deeper support to Hezbollah and the newly-formed Palestinian coalition government; and likely increases in training, weapons, and funding to the Houthi rebels in Yemen and pariah states such as the Sudan.
Fifth, Iran has gone to considerable lengths to create a global shadow apparatus designed to evade sanctions. It enables the Iranian government to support Islamic movements and pro-Iran militants around the world and spread the value of the “resistance” via cultural, social, economic, political, and business entities and organizations. That apparatus goes hand in hand with the asymmetrical nature of almost everything it does. The international community needs to develop a better understanding of this apparatus for several reasons, but largely because it is directly linked to some of Iran’s most destabilizing activities.
First, an agreement will give a much-needed boost to the Iranian economy. By most accounts, Iran stands to gain access to nearly $100 billion dollars frozen in foreign banks, as well as billions more as oil export restrictions are lifted. At the same time, several EU countries appear poised to return to Iranian markets, adding billions of dollars more in potential foreign direct investment and trade. All of this will provide the leaders of the Iran Threat Network with the resources they need to gradually return to previous levels of operational activity. It means funding proxies that were either cut off or cut back due to sanctions; reassessing the ongoing closure or downsizing of Iranian embassies in nontraditional areas such as Latin America; expanding joint military training and security programs in Africa; and increasing funding for HAMAS, PIJ, and the new Palestinian coalition government.
[If a deal is reached, there are several implications to keep in mind...] Second, several countries in the Gulf should expect to see a resumption of covert activity, including training, weapons, and non-lethal support to local proxies, especially in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, where Iran has a history of supporting Shia opposition movements. The GCC countries will also have to confront the growing threats posed by Iran in the area of Computer Network Exploitation operations. Iranian hackers employed primarily by the MOIS target the computer systems of U.S. and Gulf personnel, companies, and government facilities. Iran has treated past Stuxnet attacks on centrifuges at Natanz as a declaration of cyber war, and is now responding in kind.
With or without a nuclear deal, the strategic calculus of the Supreme Leader and much of the ruling conservative establishment is the same today as it was when the Islamic Revolution began: preserve the regime at home and deter threats from abroad, while externalizing the revolution and resistance. The IAN is the engine of the regime and will resume Iran’s pursuit of broader goals in the region. Look for a return to past levels of activity by elements of the IAN, including units of the Qods Force, whose budgets have been cut back as a result of Iran’s economic downturn. This means more operations in Syria, where Iran will continue to work closely with the Assad regime and Iran-trained, equipped, and guided militant networks; further attempts to support Shia activism in Bahrain, where Iran has attempted several times to create the conditions for regime change; continued use of Iraq as a transit point for illicit commerce coming from the Gulf, and the movement of men, money, and illicit materiel across the Levant; deeper support to Hezbollah and the newly-formed Palestinian coalition government; and likely increases in training, weapons, and funding to the Houthi rebels in Yemen and pariah states such as the Sudan.
First, a nuclear agreement with Iran will give a much-needed boost to the Iranian economy. By most accounts, Iran stands to gain access to nearly $100 billion dollars frozen in foreign banks, as well as billions more as oil export restrictions are lifted. At the same time, several EU countries appear poised to return to Iranian markets, adding billions of dollars more in potential foreign direct investment and trade. All of this will provide the leaders of the IAN with the resources they need to gradually return to previous levels of operational activity. It means funding proxies that were either cut off or cut back due to sanctions; reassessing the ongoing closure or downsizing of Iranian embassies in non-traditional areas such as Latin America; expanding joint military training and security programs in Africa; and increasing funding for Hamas, PIJ, and the new Palestinian coalition government.
U.S. policy toward Iran has focused mainly on addressing the nuclear challenge, but it has overlooked the threat posed by Iran’s global revolutionary network. Based on the dual pillars of sanctions and diplomacy, the U.S. nuclear strategy is realistically grounded, well- resourced and run about as effectively as can be expected. However, Iran’s nuclear program is just the tip of a revolutionary spear that extends across the world and that threatens key U.S. interests.
Today, Iran is hoping to cut a nuclear deal that will bring its economy back online. A revived economy is precisely what Iran needs to jump start operations in the Levant, Yemen, Afghanistan, and across the region, that have slowed down significantly due to shrinking operational budgets. Even in an environment of fiscal austerity, Iran continues to pursue a foreign policy agenda that has destabilizing effects on the region, to include the following:
- West Bank and Gaza: Iran continues to provide arms, funds, intelligence, and training to Palestinian terrorist groups, most notably, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Both groups oppose the existence of Israel and commit acts of terrorism to that end.
- Lebanon: Iran’s closest non-state ally is Lebanese Hezbollah, long considered one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations. Iranian force projection around the world depends on Hezbollah operatives and networks, from the front lines in Syria to criminal safe havens in West Africa.
- Syria: Iran’s military intervention in Syria turned the tide of the war and prevented the collapse of the Assad regime. By siding with Assad, Iran has inflamed sectarian divisions across the region, leading to an unprecedented flow of Sunni foreign fighters into Syria and surrounding countries.
- Iraq: Iran has sought to ensure that either Maliki or other pro-Iran Shiite politicians remain in control of Iraq. To counter the spread of the Islamic State, Iran is expanding Shia militia groups such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq that operate under Iran’s direction beyond the control of the Iraqi government.
- Bahrain: Iran continues to support Bahraini Shiite dissident groups that seek to overthrow the Bahraini monarchy and replace it with an Islamic republic similar to Iran. Bahraini security officials continue to see signs of Iranian support to local IED attacks.
- Saudi Arabia: Hezbollah of the Hejaz carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia, including the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran. Iran continues to stir up Shia dissident groups in eastern Saudi Arabia, and Saudi leaders generally recognize Iran as a subversive force in Syria, Lebanon, and on Saudi borders in Yemen.
- Yemen: Iran has supplied arms, funds, and probably intelligence to Houthi rebels. Along with Sudan, Yemen has become the center of Iran’s regional platform for covert arms production and distribution. African ports, increasingly seen as effective transshipment point by transnational crime organizations, serve Iran’s objectives elsewhere in the region.
- Afghanistan: Iran has consistently balanced its support for the government in Kabul with material support to the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. IAN-controlled networks on both sides of the Iran-Afghan border facilitate the illegal flow of men, money, and materiel.