Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the "Success" at Osiraq
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Absent the attack, would Iraq have had the resources to build the secret reactor fast enough to produce sufficient plutonium for a bomb by 1991? The answer is probably not. Project 182 probably began only in reaction to the destruction of Osiraq, meaning that had the attack not occurred, it would likely have taken Iraq some years to commit to the secret reactor, after plutonium production at Osiraq had been thwarted by inspectors.60 Additionally, when the program was terminated, the secret reactor was far from being built. It would have been based on the Canadian NRX design, which relied on heavy water, and ‘‘studies on the indigenous production of heavy water had not progressed beyond surveys of technical literature and preliminary laboratory measurements.’’ A 1997 IAEA report indicated that the reactor never progressed beyond ‘‘theoretical studies.’’ Finally, Iraq had planned on cannibalizing parts from the damaged Osiraq reactor for the secret reactor, including heat exchangers, primary circuit pumps, and electric generators, raising doubts as to whether the secret reactor could have been built had the attack on Osiraq not made some of its parts available for 182.61
In sum, without the Osiraq attack, Iraq would have had the physical ability to produce small amounts of fissile material (plutonium) by the early 1980s, though international inspectors would likely have detected this activity and shut down the reactor by stopping the fuel supply. With the Osiraq attack, Iraq would have had the physical ability to produce larger amounts of fissile material (enriched uranium) by the early 1990s, without any impediment from international inspectors. Notably, even if one accepts the most generous assumptions about the reactor’s ability to produce plutonium and Iraq’s abilities to dodge inspections, Saddam would likely still not have been able to build a working bomb until some years after the Gulf War because of other technical problems. By 1991 Iraqi scientists had not yet solved completely an array of thorny issues of weapons design and development*/such as designing high-explosive lenses for implosion, constructing a neutron initiator, converting the highly enriched uranium into bomb components, learning how to miniaturize the weapons enough to allow delivery by plane or missile, developing guidance systems, and finding an appropriate nuclear test site*/issues that would have been relevant whether the Iraqis built a uranium or plutonium bomb.65 That is, even without the attack, Iraq would likely not have had a nuclear weapon by 1991 because of technical barriers separate from the production of fissile material.
The 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor on Osiraq did not substantially slow the Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons. The reactor itself and the fuel it would have consumed were not well suited for plutonium production. The presence of international inspectors, foreign technicians, and constant camera surveillance would have at least substantially slowed down Iraqi plutonium production, and probably, in concert with the French ability to cut off the supply of uranium fuel, prevented it altogether. A critic might reply that a successful inspection regime would have ultimately encouraged Iraq to produce plutonium or enrich uranium in secret. However, this point does not justify the attack, because of course it caused Iraq to pursue a secret nuclear weapons program anyway, probably sooner than it would have without the attack. Finally, the attack ironically may have stimulated the Iraqi pursuit of nuclear weapons by increasing Saddam’s motivation for acquiring such weapons which led him to release a key Iraqi scientist from prison and expand the program. The attack also pushed the Iraqi program underground, removing it from the observation of international inspectors and technicians.
Last, policymakers must recognize that future airstrikes may incur much higher costs for the United States than did the 1981 attack for the Israelis. Such attacks against Iran would substantially undermine U.S./Iranian relations, perhaps leading to increased terrorism, to disruptions in the world oil market, or to an Iranian decision to intervene in Iraq in support of the Shiites. The CIA reported in 2004 that Hizballah ‘‘would likely react to an attack against it, Syria, or Iran with attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets worldwide.’’66 Striking North Korean nuclear facilities could be even worse; as General Gary Luck put it, ‘‘If we pull an Osirak [against North Korea], they will be coming south.’’67 American policymakers may be better off relying on more peaceful means of counterproliferation, such as diplomacy, inspections, and economic sanctions. These tools promise fewer costs and dangers and have demonstrated more success than military action.
But was the attack at Osiraq successful? Did it substantially delay the Iraqi nuclear program? Though current policy debates frequently invoke the Osiraq episode, there has been relatively little recent analysis of the effects of the attack. In light of the potential for such attacks in the future, developing as complete and accurate an account as possible of the Osiraq episode is critical for informing future policy decisions. If the Osiraq attack was successful, then we may be encouraged that future, similar limited strikes against nuclear facilities might also produce positive results, granted not under all conditions. However, a conclusion that the attack was largely unsuccessful would cast grave doubt over the potential success of any future such attacks, given that the historical record includes almost no other such uses of force that have had moderate or, arguably, even marginal success.9 This viewpoint argues that the conventional wisdom is wrong: The 1981 Israeli attack did not substantially delay the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Had the attack not occurred, Iraq would not have rapidly constructed nuclear weapons, because (1) the reactor itself was not well designed for plutonium production, (2) inspections would likely have detected any weapons activity, and (3) such detection would have triggered a cutoff in the supply of nuclear fuel and halted weapons activity. Further, there is some reason to believe that the attack might have even accelerated the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, since after the attack, Saddam Hussein increased his material commitment to the program and pushed it underground, out of the view of the international community.
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