Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?
Quicktabs: Citation
Either way, it is critical to recognize that this assessment rests on two fairly ambitious assumptions. The first is that all of Iran’s sensitive nuclear facilities are known to Israel and/or the United States. History provides good reason to doubt that this is true. For the last several years the IAEA has been “unable effectively to monitor the R&D activities being carried out by Iran,” except at sites with safeguarded materials, meaning that the agency cannot address concerns about the existence of covert facilities. Yet, policymakers who adopt short time horizons may calculate that a delay of up to five years would justify the dangers of preventive military strikes.
The second assumption deals with the operational feasibility of an attack, a question that has received excellent scholarly treatment elsewhere.86 Although the affordability and ubiquity of precision weapons available means that targeting states are likely to hit known targets,87 a factor that offsets improvements in military technology is that potential targets have learned from previous attacks and taken appropriate defensive measures. Just as Germany learned that it needed to better defend the Norsk-Hydro facility following the first Allied attack, Iran has learned from the Osirak and Al Kibar strikes that it should not concentrate its nuclear facilities in one location. Doing so makes it vulnerable to the possibility of a one strike success whereas disseminating the facilities makes each one less vulnerable. From a probabilistic standpoint, the more targets that attackers have to hit, the lower the likelihood of net success.
In sum, given that Iran already possesses the requisite knowledge to enrich uranium—and this knowledge cannot be taken away—the best possible outcome of military force would be delaying Tehran’s ability to build nuclear weapons by around five years. Based on our survey of the historical record, it is far from obvious that military force would yield even this modest return. Policymakers should also be aware that multiple attacks against Iran might be necessary. We now know that Iraq terminated its nuclear weapons program in the 1990s, but this happened only after three different countries (Iran, Israel, and the United States) had attacked its facilities. a factor that offsets improvements in military technology is that potential targets have learned from previous attacks and taken appropriate defensive measures. Just as Germany learned that it needed to better defend the Norsk-Hydro facility following the first Allied attack, Iran has learned from the Osirak and Al Kibar strikes that it should not concentrate its nuclear facilities in one location. Doing so makes it vulnerable to the possibility of a one strike success whereas disseminating the facilities makes each one less vulnerable. From a probabilistic standpoint, the more targets that attackers have to hit, the lower the likelihood of net success.