Our Imaginary Foe
Quicktabs: Citation
Despite their wealth, the small Gulf states know they are vulnerable. Any number of events could bring the whole dreamworld down in ruins in a very short period of time. Everyone in the region remembers what happened to Kuwait in the early days of August 1990 when one of the most prosperous countries in the world was overrun, occupied and trashed by Saddam Hussein's invading army. For this reason the Gulf states are determined to continue close military cooperation with the United States as their protector of last resort. They will provide necessary access and base rights, no matter how nervous they are about U.S. policy in the region, a fact the Iranians well understand.
If we add to the power equation U.S. air assets both in the Gulf and Iraq as well as its strategic-bomber fleets that can reach Iran from the continental United States, it is difficult to see how Iran could anytime soon seriously challenge the combined power of the United States and its Arab allies in any major military confrontation in the Gulf. No matter what happens in Iraq, the United States military, especially the U.S. fleet, is not going to leave the Gulf anytime soon. It will be decades before any other external power can replace it as custodian of the vital sea-lanes of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Asian powers, especially China, India, Japan and South Korea, have growing stakes in the economic prosperity of the Gulf and the secure supply of oil and natural gas. They do not want the United States to leave or draw down its naval assets. As the recently retired head of CENTCOM, Admiral William "Fox" Fallon, concluded in an interview with Esquire when asked about war with Iran, "Get serious. These guys are ants. When the time comes, you crush them."
Iran's ability to project power to its east is even less impressive. Pakistan and India have deployed nuclear forces in their inventories and are not subject to Iranian hegemony. For many years Iranian security analysts worried about the close ties between Pakistan and the Taliban and spoke of the nightmare of a "Talibanized Pakistan." They may still have reason to be concerned about that scenario. Iran does play an important role in Afghanistan given its geographic and historical relationship with its neighbor. Iran was helpful in establishing the Karzai provisional government in 2001 when its diplomats worked with their U.S. counterparts at the Bonn Conference in December following the defeat of the Taliban by American-led forces. Today it has considerable influence especially in Herat, which was once part of the Persian Empire. But any further encroachment of Iranian influence to the east would be challenged by Pakistan and India.
This is not to dismiss the very real threat Iran can bring to the region. What Iran can do is engage in asymmetric warfare and create mayhem for the United States, the Arab countries and Israel with its support for insurgents and terror organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas. If pushed to the limits of its tolerance, Iran could engage in a strategy of attacking Gulf oil infrastructure and blocking access to the Strait of Hormuz, at least for enough time to disrupt world oil markets. But such actions would be suicidal and put at risk Iran's own oil and gas exports and the facilities that produce them. Having the capacity to cause damage may give Iran a strong hand to play in regional geopolitics, but this does not mean it can be a regional hegemon. The more heavy-handed Iranian interference in the Arab world and against Israel, the more it will likely face countervailing challenges from the neighborhood, the United States and maybe at some point NATO forces. The fact that France has agreed to establish a small military base in the UAE, announced during President Sarkozy's visit to the region, is indicative that the United States is not the only external power concerned about Iranian behavior and the need to present the mullahs with a robust military presence in the region.
A Covert Iranian Nuclear Deployment will be more Manageable than an Overt, Pakistan-Style Deployment
Nevertheless, it is necessary to address how the balance of military power would change if Iran continues to develop its nuclear program. Much will depend upon the nature of a future Iranian nuclear-weapons capability. If it remains covert and Iran does not brag about it--even though everyone may assume Iran could assemble a bomb in a matter of months--the consequences will be serious but manageable. If, on the other hand, Iran withdraws from the NPT and goes full throttle toward a deployable nuclear force, perhaps analogous to Pakistan's, the repercussions would be more severe. Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and possibly Turkey could reassess their nonproliferation commitments. In the case of the Saudis it could lead to a Pakistani nuclear presence on the Arabian Peninsula, a development that could hardly make Iran feel stronger or more secure.