Nuclear deal with Iran would benefit Iranian moderates and improve prospects for democratic reform
Successful completion of the nuclear deal would give Iranian moderates grounds for arguing that Iran is on the verge of achieving enough international stability to finally allow it to turn its attention to the domestic tasks of the revolution.
Quicktabs: Arguments
Third, the deal will help unleash Iran's vibrant, young (the median age is 28!) and moderate society, which is continuously pushing Iran in a democratic direction. The deal enjoys solid support among the Iranian public as well as among Iranian civil society leaders, partly because they believe the deal "would enable political and cultural reforms."
America benefits if the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people are increasingly met, because a more democratic Iran is a more moderate Iran.
This is particularly important at a time when the violent winds of religious radicalism are ravaging the Middle East and beyond. America is in desperate need of an injection of political moderation in the region. An Iran that moves towards democracy could provide that.
MYTH: 4) A nuclear deal will worsen human rights in Iran and sell out the Iranian people.
Nonsense. Iranian civil society remains unwavering in its support for a nuclear deal, believing it is the only way to achieve peace domestically and internationally. According to a recent study, respondents were unanimous in favor of a deal, and 61% of respondents believe it would enable political and cultural reforms in Iran - precisely because a nuclear deal will likely strengthen Rouhani's political ability to address such issues. Conversely, respondents were unanimous in their belief that failure to secure a deal will result in increased repression, further loss of political and cultural freedoms, and possibly war.
It is important to note that a short-term increase in human rights abuses may occur in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear deal. Some hardline Iranian officials will likely want to send a message: Do not mistake our opening to the world for "weakness" at home. However, a Rouhani administration empowered by a nuclear deal and improved relations with the world will likely have the ability to improve Iran's human rights situation over the medium to long term. This is change that Iranian society can tolerate: They know better than any population in the region that violent change rarely improves human rights, while gradual (and at times, painful) reform has a far grater chance of success.
Research conducted by experts from the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, has shown that Iranians themselves believe that a nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers will lead to internal political and cultural reforms in Iran. A recent report shows that "sixty-one percent [of Iranians] believe a deal would enable political and cultural reforms, as a politically strengthened Rouhani administration could now turn its focus to such issues."
The Executive Director of the Campaign, Hadi Ghaemi, believes that the nuclear agreement will "will have the potential to validate voices of moderation and embolden those who have called for a loosening of the political and cultural environment in Iran." Indeed, the Campaign asserts that, "every poll undertaken has confirmed Iranian society's strong support for the nuclear negotiations, and the resounding electoral win of the centrist Hassan Rouhani reflects society's desire for greater political and social freedoms."
Activists inside Iran see it as a beginning. As a way to empower Rouhani, who campaigned not just on economic stimulation, but on opening up freedoms for the Iranian people, and establishing a more moderate government. They think this will empower him and could be the opening that they're looking for.
After a nuclear deal, Rouhani will have strong politi- cal winds at his back. He will have succeeded in delivering on his promise to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to relieve the devastating sanctions harm- ing Iran’s economy and that could have threatened the regime’s stability. With this success, he may have the Supreme Leader’s support and more lever- age inside the Iranian system to play an increasingly influential role in Iran’s regional policies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and wrestle some control away from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force (IRGC-QF).17 He may also potentially be able to leverage the agreement to make some domestic social reforms – though thus far in his presidency he has failed to exert influence in this arena.18
The Iranian public’s support for Rouhani and his faction could increase substantially, which could translate into greater influence and more seats in the parliament. The agreement’s popularity was appar- ent when, after agreeing on parameters for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Foreign Minister Zarif returned from Lausanne to a hero’s welcome from street protestors.19 Iran is not a democracy, and popular support alone is not enough to shift the internal political balance toward Rouhani, but the population has some influence. The government “vets” all candidates for office, ensuring they are acceptable, and there is a history of manipulating outcomes.20 But popular support matters, as dem- onstrated by Rouhani’s surprise election in 2013 when he received barely over 50 percent of the vote and was allowed to assume the presidency without a runoff – which would have been necessary had he achieved only a plurality – even though his views were not as closely aligned with the Supreme Leader as some of the other candidates.21
While the deal provides assurance for the international community that Iran would not have the hardware to make nuclear weapons and places its program under intrusive inspection, it also, Iranians hope, could change the course of their country. People are optimistic that with the lifting of international pressure, the economy will improve and they can find the space to force the regime to respect human dignity and rule of law.
With the deal, the country's Islamic rulers had finally broken the taboo of speaking to the United States, often referred to as The Great Satan. For 20 months, Iran's foreign minister, Javad Zarif, and Secretary of State John Kerry spent more time with one another than they did with any other foreign official.
Now, liberal forces in Iran who brokered the deal, need to work further with their American counterparts to see that it is implemented. Analysts believe the process will empower them and marginalize hardliners, whose hawkish policies at home and in the region, and support for Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, have been a source of embarrassment for many Iranians.
Political scientist Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor at Tehran University, told The Guardian that the nuclear deal will most likely translate into greater electoral support for the liberals in the 2016 Parliamentary elections. Because of their engagement with the West, they will be forced to craft policies that are more responsive to international demands.
Iran's economic opening to the world could fuel social and even political change over time. Most young Iranians have little memory of the 1979 Iranian revolution or Iran's long war with Iraq (1980-88), both events that have heavily shaped negative perceptions of the United States. Rather, most of Iran's post-revolutionary generation views the United States as a technological powerhouse and a land of personal opportunity. This doesn't mean that they agree with Washington's policies toward the Middle East; and it doesn't mean that Iran's youth culture and American norms are neatly in sync. Rather, there is enough convergence between Iranian and American societal ideals to impact future political relations. Iran's reactionary Ayatollahs will not be at the forefront of change; but the revolutionary class that has sustained enmity toward America cannot live forever.
The nuclear agreement and better U.S.-Iran relations will provide a unique opportunity for policy makers to increase people-to-people communications and exchanges between the two nations. The U.S. trade embargo to Iran does not prohibit exports of certain telecommunication software and hardware. Policymakers should continue to encourage access to communication tools for the people of Iran and establish a mechanism for their payment through direct banking links with Iran. Such a channel could also be used to enhance the flow of food and medicine to Iran, as well as facilitate personal and family remittances in a manner that is more transparent and safe.
The results of a 2015 Public Opinion Survey commissioned by the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian-Americans showed that nearly two-thirds of Iranian-Americans approved of the P5+1 (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France, Germany) framework agreement while 20 percent disapproved. The vast majority of Iranian-Americans have maintained close ties to family members in Iran. They want to see an Iran that is pluralistic and democratic and are hopeful that — in the wake of an agreement — the social and economic situation will improve for the people of Iran.
While the nuclear accord will not change Iran immediately, it will allow for incremental changes in the country. It offers an opportunity for economic growth to loosen the security-dominated atmosphere in Iranian society. And it opens opportunities for greater people-to-people exchanges between Iran and the United States. Ultimately Iran's gradual opening will allow what the Iranian regime fears the most; the loss of the United States as an enemy and its emergence as a source of inspiration.
As Congress deliberates on whether or not to accept the nuclear deal with Iran, lawmakers would be wise to also keep in mind how a rejection of the deal would impact the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people.
Rouhani crushed his conservative opponents in the 2013 presidential election in part because he advocated for a nuclear deal. This agreement is his Obamacare. Those supporting the deal include moderates inside the government, many opposition leaders, a majority of Iranian citizens, and many in the Iranian American diaspora—a disparate group that has rarely agreed on anything until now.
First and most obviously, the moderates within the regime, including Rouhani and his close friend and political ally, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, negotiated the agreement, and are now the most vocal in defending it against Iranian hawks. Rouhani crushed his conservative opponents in the last presidential election in 2013 in part because he advocated for a nuclear deal. This agreement is his Obamacare—his major campaign promise now delivered. Former Presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, as well as moderates in the parliament and elsewhere in government, have also vigorously endorsed the accord. During the negotiations, Rafsanjani, for example, celebrated the fact that Iran’s leaders had “broken a taboo” in talking directly to the United States. Since the agreement was signed, he has said that those within Iran who oppose it are “making a mistake.”
Second and somewhat surprisingly, many prominent opposition leaders also support the deal. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a popular presidential candidate in 2009 who is now under house arrest for his leadership of the Green Movement protests against Ahmadinejad’s reelection, backed the pursuit of the agreement, albeit with some qualifications. He’s joined by other government critics, some only recently released from Iran’s prisons. Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian human-rights activist and Nobel laureate now living in exile, expressed the hope after an interim agreement was reached in April that “negotiations come to a conclusion, because the sanctions have made the people poorer”; she labeled as “extremists” those who opposed the agreement in Iran and America. Akbar Ganji, an Iranian journalist who spent more than six years in prison in Iran, also praised the agreement, writing that “step-by-step nuclear accords, the lifting of economic sanctions and the improvement of the relations between Iran and Western powers will gradually remove the warlike and securitized environment from Iran.”
Polls show that most Iranians agree with these positions, and public opinion is apparent not just in the Iranian government’s numbers but also in the results of earlier surveys conducted by the University of Maryland and Tehran University. The sentiments of many ordinary Iranians were manifest in the spontaneous demonstrations of joy that took place in many Iranian cities after the agreement was announced.
Opponents claim Iranian negotiators caved on key issues and were outmaneuvered by more clever and sinister American diplomats. Conservatives in Iran may be right. Iran’s opening to the outside world may weaken the ruling regime, as eventually Mao Zedong’s opening to the West did in the 1970s in China, and Gorbachev’s opening to the West did in the 1980s in the U.S.S.R. But these historical analogies also suggest that Iranian hardliners may be wrong. China’s overtures to the West undermined communist ideology and practices, but have proved essential in keeping the Chinese Communist Party in power so far. Gorbachev’s bold steps toward international integration eventually allowed both market and democratic institutions to take hold in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Yet the current counterrevolutionary backlash inside Russia suggests that the struggle for democracy, markets, and integration there will be long and tumultuous. There is no guarantee that Iran’s will be any less so.
No one knows what scenario will unfold in Iran. But the debate inside the country should inform America’s own debate. If the deal, as some American critics claim, sells out Iranian democrats and strengthens theocrats, why do so many Iranian reformists, democracy activists, and even dissidents support it? If it represents a financial windfall for Iranian conservatives and their terrorist allies abroad, why are Iran’s most conservative politicians so passionately against it?
Maybe Iran’s democrats are naive. And maybe the conservatives are playing a clever game of deception. Yet given America’s less-than-sterling track record of supporting Iran’s reformers, perhaps this time it’s worth listening to and betting on those in the country whom the United States claims to champion.
Given the number of domestic challenges the Islamic Republic is facing, most notably a tremendous growth in its youthful population, combined with the incompetence and corruption that has marked its stewardship of the Iranian economy, it is hard to imagine that this regime can continue to avoid collapse without significant reform.12 At the same time, there is little reason to expect that a democratic revolution is imminent. The reform movements that seemed so promising in the late 1990s have largely been defeated. The best strategy for revitalizing these movements is to encourage Tehran's involvement in the world economy, as opposed to further attempts at isolation. Increasing the Iranian people's exposure to the world economy is much more likely to increase motivation and expand the resources available to any future reform movement. Iran's eventual inclusion in the World Trade Organization is one of the carrots currently being held out to Iran as part of ongoing negotiations regarding its nuclear program. Such incentives may advance America's long-term foreign policy goals in the region even if those efforts fail to negate Iran's development of a nuclear weapon.
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The nuclear deal with Iran has sparked a vigorous debate not only in the United States, but in Iran as well with a broad moderate political consensus, supported by overwhelming public support for the deal.
[ More ]The author reflects on her experience growing up in Iran and how the nuclear deal could start to change the decades of enimity between the U.S. and Iran that she witnessed.
[ More ]Iranians overwhelmingly support the nuclear deal, seeing it as opening up the possibility for more economic cooperation and dialogue with the West and improving the prospects for democratic reform in Iran.
[ More ]Jeremy Friedman argues that we should be optimistic about the prospects that the Iranian nuclear deal will bring about more democratic reform in Iran because he notes that the economy is forcing the question and there is an undercurrent in Iranian culture that is ready for reform.
[ More ]Alireza Nader encourages optimisim in Iran's movement towards democratic reform but warns that it will take time for these changes to take effect.
[ More ]For Iran watchers, a possible deal to rein in the country’s nuclear program raises questions about its impact not only on arms control in the region but also on Tehran’s complex internal politics.
[ More ]