U.S. needs Iranian cooperation to stabilize Iraq
Without satisfactory working relationships among Washington, Tehran, and Baghdad, the future stability of the new Iraqi regime could be in doubt. Iran has immediate influence on Iraqi politics because of history and geography, as well as economic, ethnic, religious, and paramilitary ties. The extent to which Iran uses this influence to negatively affect events in Iraq will be determined in large part by the future relationship between Iran and the United States
Quicktabs: Arguments
Second, many analysts overlook “Iran’s significant soft power.” Iranian pilgrims travel to Shiite shrines in Iraq and provide a significant source of income to local communities there. Tehran has also been actively involved in construction projects, including building health clinics and schools. This soft power, along with the long borders the two nations share, suggests that the Islamic Republic maintains a significant leverage in Iraq’s present and future. It is hard to imagine sustainable peace in post-Hussein Iraq without support from Tehran.
Arab Gulf states will feel the Iranian threat most acutely. Iraq, for example, will continue to see Iran as the largest and most formidable national security threat in the region regardless what shape, form, or nature the post-Saddam government in Baghdad eventually takes. A relatively transparent, moderately disposed government in Baghdad probably would want American military reassurance to shore up its security vis-à-vis Iran. The Iraqis might be amenable to residual American and international ground and air forces hosted in Iraq. The Iraqis might want a profile small enough to minimize charges by political opposition that the Iraqis are subservient to the Americans, but large enough to serve as a "trip wire" to deter Iranian military ambitions against Iraq, particularly as Iraq's new armed forces are just taking root. The American presence in Iraq also would reassure Iraqis that the Iranians could not parlay their nuclear weapons for political coercion against Iraq.
External support can come in the form of moral, political, or material assistance, from a number of places, including states, Diasporas, refugees, and non-state actors (i.e. non-governmental organizations).[3] From the Tamil Diaspora to Al-Qaeda, different types of external supporters have impacted a number of insurgent conflicts as of late. Notwithstanding the growing influence that these types groups can have, particularly in a post Cold War environment, the fact remains that the material support provided by states is the most influential type of external support an insurgency can receive. The role and impact external states have had on insurgencies like the American Revolution, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet-Afghan War speaks for itself. While other types of support and supporters have impacted various modern conflicts, no similar combination has been as instrumental in contributing to insurgent victories.This combination is significant for two reasons: first, external states are typically in the best position to provide the high levels of material support an insurgency craves, in the form financing, supplies, and armaments. During the American Revolution, only a state like France could have consistently provided Washington’s army with the amount of “gold, clothing, and cannons” he needed to engage the British army. Second, given the relative capabilities of states, external state supporters are uniquely positioned to coordinate and provide for the advanced types of material support that insurgents cannot readily obtain from anywhere else, including intelligence, training, and relevant technology. Hezbollah’s de-facto victory over Israel in the summer of 2006 was largely attributable to Iranian support in the form advanced military training, anti-tank weaponry, and Katyusha rockets.
Carr, Ryan. "
Understanding Iran's Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support."
Strategic Insights. VI, No. 5 (August 2007).
[ More ]
One of the most vociferous arguments made by the United States’ concerns Iran’s supply of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and similar technological assistance, to elements of the Iraqi insurgency. In its findings, the Iraq Study Group also noted, “there are also reports that Iran has supplied improvised explosive devices to groups—including Sunni Arab insurgents—that attack U.S. forces.”[26] Weapons such as these have contributed to the proficiency with which insurgents have been able to attack American forces. As of May 2007, these types of weapons were responsible for 38.6 percent of all U.S. casualties.[27] Reports also suggest that other high-tech weaponry, including mortars and sniper rifles, purchased by Iran, have ended up in the hand of Iraqi insurgents.[28] U.S. intelligence officials have been quick to point out that Iran has consciously refrained from supplying Shiite militias with more sophisticated weaponry, such as the surface-to-air missiles that have been used by Hezbollah against Israel, so as not to provide the Bush Administration with any grounds for a direct military response.
Carr, Ryan. "
Understanding Iran's Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support."
Strategic Insights. VI, No. 5 (August 2007).
[ More ]
In all likelihood, Iran’s 2003 attempt to open up a dialogue with the United States points to the fact that they were likely worried that they might be the next member of the “axis of evil” to suffer a preemptive strike, particularly after the United States initially rolled right through the Iraqi army with ease. At the same time, the Bush administration was riding high following its display of “shock and awe,” and was not interested in any dialogue. Not surprising, as the United States spent late 2003 moving to consolidate its hold over Iraq, there were no reports about Iran providing support to the Iraqi insurgency. In fact, at the time, Iran even agreed to suspend elements of its nuclear program. One can presume that at this point Iran was afraid to play any role in fomenting unrest in Iraq for fear that the Bush administration would use any pre-text it could to confront Tehran militarily. But as the security situation in the Iraq rapidly deteriorated, it seems likely that Iran felt increasing emboldened, and by 2004/05 they were willing to begin taking risks in order to help sustain an insurgency that was preoccupying the United States.
Carr, Ryan. "
Understanding Iran's Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support."
Strategic Insights. VI, No. 5 (August 2007).
[ More ]
Without satisfactory working relationships among Washington, Tehran, and Baghdad, the future stability of the new Iraqi regime could be in doubt. Iran has immediate influ ence on Iraqi politics because of history and geography, as well as economic, ethnic, religious, and paramilitary ties. The extent to which Iran uses this influence to negatively affect events in Iraq will be determined in large part by the future relationship between Iran and the United States. Iranian influence in Iraq is widespread, but its impact is ambiguous. Iran provided financial support to Shiite-backed political groups that helped them win a near majority in the Iraqi elections held on January 30, 2005. The success of those elections, with approximately 58 percent of Iraqis participating-despite a violent campaign by insurgents aimed at disrupting the vote-has changed the political calculus in Iraq. The insurgency failed in its aim to seriously disrupt or delegitimize the elections, thus bolstering both the provisional Iraqi government and the position of the United States.
Although alleged Iranian support for some insurgent actions appears to contradict its open stance of supporting legitimate Shiite-backed political groups, such activity highlights broader Iranian intentions of covering all its bases in Iraq in the event of a serious downturn in relations with both the United States and a future Iraqi government. Most of all, Iran does not want to see a new threat from Iraq re-emerge. The threat could be manifested in a number of ways: by a Shiite-Sunni civil war, the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, the establishment of a rival Shiite clerical government, or the establishment of a united government that is closely allied with the United States. To ensure that it can influence any potential outcome, Iran has established relationships of varying degrees with almost every faction in Iraq, in effect hedging its bets. Tehran's mullahs have shown anxiety about a strong, pro-Western government in Baghdad that could offer permanent basing rights to U.S. forces and perhaps even have relations with Israel. But the conservative mullahs are also concerned, although more ambivalent, about the emergence of a strong Shiite-dominated clerical government in Baghdad. The complexities of the Shiite religion suggest that there would be rivalry between the clerical establishments, with Iraq's powerful religious centers of Najaf and Karbala eventually providing alternative sources of theological discourses to Qom, the religious center of Iran; yet this could be the case even without a clerical government in Baghdad. What Iran would prefer to see ideally in Iraq is a friendly neighbor that presents no discernable threat to its clerical regime either militarily or politically.
