Iran has chemical and biological weapons arsenal
State department reports consistently list Iran as one of the states expected to be developing an offensive biological weapons program. During the 8-year long Iran-Iraq war, Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and it is expected that Iran has developed both chemical and biological weapons to be able to respond in kind to future attacks.
Quicktabs: Arguments
Of course, some argue that Iran has already demonstrated biological weapons ambitions. Indeed, Iran was suspected of initiating offensive biological work in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011a), and media sources in the late 1990s documented efforts by Tehran to recruit former Soviet bioweaponeers (Miller and Broad, 1998). Accounts of an Iranian biological weapons program in the past or present, however, have not been proved. This uncertainty should come as no surprise given the many factors that can shroud external knowledge of foreign biological weapons programs, which can readily be disguised or hidden within a country's peaceful biological research networkÑas occurred infamously in the Soviet Union, where, in the early 1990s, it was discovered that behind the Iron Curtain a massive offensive biological weapons enterprise had employed some 65,000 scientists working in dozens of facilities throughout the country (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011b).
While Iran's strategic thinking and intent with regard to biological weapons are difficult to assess from the outside, its technological capabilities are more vulnerable to external assessment and provide important information on Iran's threat potential.1 Iran possesses the scientific infrastructure and knowledge base necessary for a biological weapons program. Specifically, Iran's advanced pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries present what is known as a dual-use risk: The same materials, equipment, and expertise used for the development and production of legitimate biological products can also be employed for illicit weapons activities (US Department of State, 2005). Indeed, with its longstanding ventures in vaccine development and production and its growing expertise in cutting-edge biotechnologies, including genetic engineering, Iran boasts one of the developing world's most advanced life science industries (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011a; Westerdahl et al., 2003).
Beyond these enabling conditions, US government agencies have assessed that Iran also possesses the more specific know-how critical for mature weapons development -- namely, the capability to produce and weaponize biological agents, as well as technologies for their delivery. For example, a 2005 report by the US Department of State concluded, "Iran is technically capable of producing at least rudimentary, bulk-fill biological warheads for a variety of delivery systems, including missiles" (US Department of State, 2005: 20). In 2006, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported to Congress that Iran "probably has the capability to produce large-quantities of some Biological Warfare agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so" (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008: 4). The 2009 ODNI report reiterated this concern but omitted the descriptor "large quantities" from its assessment (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009: 5).
Even if Iran has not actively pursued biological weapons in recent years, it can reasonably be argued that the country has engaged in "hedging behavior" by conducting advanced dual-use research and developing dual-use infrastructure to bolster breakout capacities in the areas of chemical and biological warfare (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011). According to a US State Department report (US Department of State, 2005: 21), Iran's expanding biotechnology industry could "easily hide pilot to industrial-scale production capabilities for a potential [biological weapons] program, and could mask procurement of [biological weapons-]related process equipment." Also, dual-use activities in Iran have included "conducting research involving [biological weapons]-related pathogens and genetic engineering, and developing mechanisms that could be used to deliver biological agents" (US Department of State, 2010: 16). In 2003, the CIA assessed that Iran's ability to weaponize biological agents was limited, but as Iran's dual-use research and technology base continues to advance, so does its ability to perform weapons relevant processes (Central Intelligence Agency, 2003).
Nonproliferation and Middle East expert Avner Cohen has explained that one of the difficulties in assessing the possibilities of biological armament in the Middle East is understanding the "linkages that strategically and politically tie [biological weapons] to the two other categories on the WMD spectrum, chemical and nuclear weapons" (Cohen, 2002). It has been argued that the "state-security motive for biological armament is strong" in the Middle East, a region that has seen chemical weapons fail to serve as a reliable deterrent against nuclear-armed adversaries and where nuclear armament "is technologically and economically unfeasible for most" (Drake, 2002: 151).
There are three main factors hindering a thorough, objective estimate of present and evolving Iranian military CBW capabilities:
- The efficient Iranian counter-intelligence system constitutes a powerful apparatus with the mission of concealing the WMD activity, overseen by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
- Analytical mixing of unrelated issues, allowing an intelligence issue (how close is Iran to a nuclear bomb?) to affect a methodical inquiry into the substance of Iranian CBW capabilities, undermining the independence of two inquiries;
- The mistaken 2003 American intelligence on Iraqi CBW, a lasting precedent bringing about excessive cautiousness, beyond pure intelligence considerations, to avoid future overestimations. The profound impact of the 2003 pre-war intelli- gence estimate regarding the Iraqi military CBW capabilities affects, presumably, the current judgment on Iranian capabilities.
In spite of those difficulties, the general picture is fairly coherent. To start with, and considering that Iraq already in 1990 had an operational arsenal of both chemical- and biological-capable ballistic missiles, it would be unreasonable – even if inferentially – to discount the existence of an analogue arsenal in Iran today, almost 20 years later. Already towards the year 2000 Iran became an acknowledged regional power in terms of CBW capabilities.3 At about that time Iran probably could deploy BW, which it could deliver via terrorist saboteurs, aerosol tanks mounted on aircraft or ships, or missiles,4 while parts of Iran’s biological inventory likely took operational shape.5
Since then Iran systematically upgraded those capabilities. It was the same Iranian opposition group that had uncovered the crucial nuclear facility of Natanz, who once again contributed information about Iran’s BW programme layout and expansion. A very extensive Iranian BW-oriented infrastructure was revealed. Biological warfare agents, reportedly including anthrax, smallpox, plague, botulinum toxin and ricin toxin, have been serially manufactured and weaponized by Iran.6 Further, as of 2006, the German Customs and the Federal Criminal Investigations Office pointed out that front companies for Iranian intelligence are acquiring equipment for biologi- cal production.7 All this evidence supports the conclusion that Iran has reached oper- ational ability to deliver biological warheads, including missile-delivered ones.
Reports indicate that Iran has established its competence with a variety of technol- ogies related to development, testing and serial production of chemical and biological warfare agents, plus tactical and strategic delivery systems. Further, Tehran consist- ently follows the ballistic plus WMD course paved by North Korea, which for more than a decade has possessed operational, ballistic missiles tipped with CB warheads. Strong incentives for cooperation between the two countries in terms of WMD have been observed to underlie their interrelations,12 and whatever new ballistic designs North Korea makes migrate to Iran.13 In 2006, this cooperation reached the transfer of at least 18 BM25 ballistic missiles (range 2,500–3,500 km) from North Korea to Iran.14 Close collaboration between the two countries persists in the ballistic domain, and it most probably includes the component of varitype WMD warheads. This is an expedient property marking Tehran–Pyongyang strategic interface. Technologically, Iran is the grand beneficiary. Russia, China and Pakistan are secondary – yet certainly significant – contributors to Iran, in that connection.
The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, in conjunction with the IRGC, sustain a worldwide network posing major strategic capabilities.38 CBR warfare agents either are in IRGC possession or readily accessible. A terrorist attack directed from Tehran could include use of a chemical, biological, or radiological weapon.39
A report by the US Department of State concluded that ‘Iran presents a particular concern; given its active sponsorship of terrorism ... Iran could support terrorist organizations seeking to acquire WMD.’40 Israeli military intelligence has expressed more direct concern that Iran might provide chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon.41 Given that Iran possesses various BW, former CIA director James Wolsey described the Hezbollah as a potential tool for biological terrorism. Unveri- fied but consistent reports stress Wadi Firsan Base (in the Hermel, Bekaa Valley of Lebanon) as a location where CW had been hidden.42 Lebanon, which cannot manufacture chemical weapons, and Syria, which definitely can, are among the seven states that have not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.
While Iranian nuclear weapons are still under development, biological and chemi- cal weapons, and possibly radiological weapons, are already operational. They are most apt to be employed by Iran in reprisal to such an attack. Innately, Iran is prone to dare what Iraq did not. The implications of this study pertain, foremost, to Israel and America. The strategic vulnerability of Israel to non-nuclear WMD is well known, despite various protective and defensive measures in which the Israeli government has invested.100 This vulnerability might possibly near existential level. The threat to the United States is restricted in comparison, yet its potential mag- nitude is still considerable.
Therefore, taking into account the serious risk of an Iranian CBR-based second strike, a preemptive attack cannot focus exclusively on its nuclear establishment. Rather than being discrete, a preemptive attack has to be massive. To be effective, it must incapacitate Iranian CBR potency, immediately before or in conjunction with the destruction of nuclear facilities. This would mean, in practical terms, hitting the Iranian storage and deployment facilities of CBR warfare agents, munitions, warheads, and/or delivery systems. Treating the threat of Iranian-induced CBR terrorism acts is another, highly significant dimension, and not a less complicated one, in its way.
Not in vain, Alexis Debat notes, the Pentagon had drawn up plans for massive air- strikes against 1,200 targets in Iran, designed to annihilate the Iranians’ military capability in three days. ‘They’re about taking out the entire Iranian military’, he noted. ‘The US military had concluded that whether you go for pinprick strikes or all-out military action, the reaction from the Iranians will be the same.’ It was, he added, a ‘very legitimate strategic calculus’.101 Although seemingly drastic and outstandingly complex, such a military operation has its own, sound rationale, one inherent component of which is, in all likelihood, the desirable elimination of Iran’s CBR retaliatory capabilities. Inversely, that factor would cause the Iranians to carry out CBR-based retaliatory moves as early as possible, using their CBR arsenal as fast as possible, while it remained functional. Naturally, this tentative interplay is challenging for both the attacker and for the responder. And the responder is quite able; it should be handled meticulously.
The U.S. Intelligence Community believes Iran probably has an offensive biological weapons program but lacks clear intelligence proving that this is the case. The U.S. Intelligence Community stated in its November 2004 721 Report: “Tehran probably maintains an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran's biological warfare program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them."