Saudi Arabia likely to pursue nuclear weapons to counter a nuclear Iran

Despite these military upgrades, Saudi lead- ers fear that nuclear weapons would provide Iran with cover for conventional – or, even more likely, unconventional – aggression against the Kingdom.⁵⁵ The primary Saudi concern is not a direct Iranian assault but rather the possibil- ity that nuclear weapons would provide a shield behind which Iran’s revolutionary leadership could promote Shia subversion and militancy in the Kingdom and across the region with impunity.⁵⁶ Riyadh views the growing political restlessness of Shia populations in the country’s Eastern Province, as well as in surrounding Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait and Lebanon, as a threat that could eventually metastasize into an existential challenge to the House of Saud.⁵⁷ The political turmoil associated with the Arab Spring has heightened these con- cerns. Indeed, in the current environment, Saudi leaders have tended to exaggerate Tehran’s hidden hand, ascribing any and all forms of instability and Shia activism in the Middle East to a conscious Iranian strategy to destabilize the Kingdom and other Gulf monarchies.⁵⁸ But even if Saudi concerns sometimes border on paranoia, history suggests that new nuclear-armed states tend to be emboldened, at least for a time, to pursue more aggressive foreign policies by the belief that nuclear weapons protect them from devastating retalia- tion. It is therefore not completely unreasonable for Saudi leaders to fear that Iranian adventurism would be empowered by nuclear weapons.⁵⁹

By almost all measures of national power, Iran is significantly ahead of Saudi Arabia and other neighboring Arab states. It is these states, and the Sunni-Shia tensions that accompany Iran’s relations with them, that provide the greatest enduring challenge to Iran’s security.

Nuclear weapons may be the only means by which Saudi Arabia could equalize Iran’s overall power. Iranian leaders, particularly President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, recognize this. In private conversations, when they list reasons why it is not in Iran’s interest to transform its nuclear potential into actual nuclear weapons, Iranian leaders cite the risk of stimulating nuclear proliferation by their neighbors as number one.

Yet the Saudis are often far more subtle and creative than others give them credit for. Even if Iran were to acquire an actual weapon or a near-term breakout capability, the Saudis might not simply take the obvious path forward and buy a nuclear weapon itself. There are many ways that the Saudis could take actions that would create ambiguity and make Iran (and others) wonder whether the Saudis had acquired a nuclear capability without declaring that the Kingdom had joined the nuclear club. Riyadh could build a nuclear plant of its own and begin to enrich uranium, perhaps even hiring large numbers of Pakistanis and other foreigners to do so very quickly, in almost exactly the same manner that the Iranians have proceeded. A favorite Israeli scenario is that one day, satellite imagery of Saudi Arabia suddenly reveals the presence of a half-dozen nuclear-capable Pakistani F-16s at a Saudi air base. Pakistan has long contributed military support, equipment and even whole formations to Saudi defense, so this would not be anything extraordinary. Everyone would wonder whether the F-16s had brought nuclear weapons with them and the Saudis could studiously avoid answering the question. The Iranians, and the whole world, would not know. There would be no proof that the Kingdom had acquired a nuclear weapon and therefore no particular basis to impose sanctions on Riyadh. Yet overnight, the Iranians would have to calculate that the Kingdom had acquired a nuclear weapon, but it would be very difficult for anyone to punish the Saudis because there would be no evidence that they had.

The third argument often cited to suggest that Saudi Arabia would not pursue nuclear weapons relates to Saudi Arabia's nuclear technology capabilities. There exists a relatively strong consensus regarding the immature state of Saudi Arabia's nuclear technology infrastructure. Saudi Arabia lacks the human expertise and the technical knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapons program on its own. Experts consistently describe Saudi Arabia's nuclear infrastructure and know how as far inferior to Egypt and Turkey. Notwithstanding these apparent facts, observers should not underestimate Saudi Arabia's ability to obtain the technology required. Many scholars and U.S. diplomats believe Saudi Arabia may have some sort of formal or informal understanding with Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have common interests and complementary assets. Pakistan has a nuclear capability and limited money, while Saudi Arabia has no nuclear capability and virtually unlimited money. While no solid evidence exists to confirm the formalization of such an agreement, some circumstantial evidence suggests an agreement or ''understanding'' may exist. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both primarily Sunni countries, both have a history of tense relations with Iran. Also, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan enjoy a long history of military cooperation. In fact, Pakistani deployed troops to Saudi soil from 1979 to 1987, and the two countries cooperated extensively in the 1980s to fight the Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan. Furthermore, then-Crown Prince Abdullah visited Pakistan a few months after Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests, raising some eyebrows. None of this proves the existence of a nuclear understanding between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but if such an agreement exists, the transfer could manifest itself in four different forms. First, in the eventuality of an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Pakistanis could transfer nuclear technology or materials to the Saudis. This transfer could jump-start the Saudi nuclear program and would dramatically reduce the time between a Saudi political decision to move forward on nuclear weapons and the Saudi development of a nuclear weapons capability. This transfer could take place at the official government to government level or at the subnational level, reminiscent of the A.Q. Kahn network. Pakistan could also deploy Pakistani nuclear forces to Saudi Arabia. This scenario may not incur the same international condemnation of the other two options and arguably would not violate the NPT.