Iran would behave more aggressively with a nuclear weapon

From its very inception the Islamic Republic has employed terror to achieve its strategic and religious aims. It has killed American soldiers, directly or by proxy, in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan, supported terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas that attack civilians in Israel and elsewhere, aided Syria’s al-Assad regime in suppressing peaceful demonstrators, and repeatedly undermined the stability of our Arab allies. Most recently, American authorities revealed that elements of Iran’s IRGC had planned a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, marking a new level of provocation, while Iranian military leaders threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a critical energy shipping lane. An Iran with nuclear weapons capability, overconfident behind its own perceived nuclear deterrent, can only be expected to act even more aggressively.

Nuclear weapons may embolden Iran to become more aggressive regionally. This concern reflects the “stability/instability paradox”: while nuclear weapons may create stable nuclear deterrence, paradoxically, this may actually encourage greater conventional adventurousness.² A nuclear Iran may believe that its arsenal will deter the United States and its regional allies from retaliating should Tehran engage in regional provocations. These provocations could take several forms. Iran may invade a neighbor, use conventional forces to challenge ship- ping in the Persian Gulf, engage in subversive activities in regional states or support insurgencies, increase its material support for terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or encourage terrorist attacks.

These propositions are oft-repeated. Tertrais writes that “nuclear Iran would feel emboldened to project its power and influence in the region.” Specifically, he argues that Iran’s “new status” would “incite” it to increase support for Hamas, “making the peace process even more complex.”⁴² Michael Eisenstadt cautions that nuclear weapons will “embolden Tehran to behave more aggressively, to more frequently resort to coercive diplomacy, to ramp up its support for terrorism, or to undertake military adventures.”⁴³ Sagan envisions a scenario in which members of the IRGC “feel that it is safer for them… to attack Americans in Iraq, to attack military bases in the region, to support terrorist attacks elsewhere.”⁴⁴ Kenneth Pollack writes that Iran may calculate that its “nuclear shield” allows it to support “subversion, nonnuclear terrorism, [and] insurgencies” because its adversaries would be hard pressed to retaliate given “the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange.”⁴⁵ And Eric Edelman and colleagues write that at the very least, nuclear Iran will become “increasingly aggressive.”⁴⁶ These and other authors often turn to Pakistan, circa 1999, and Iraq, circa 1990, for illustration. In the first case, a year after testing a nuclear weapon and flush with its newfound power, Pakistan sent paramilitary forces into India-controlled Kashmir. The conflict, pitting two nuclear rivals, escalated rather spectacularly. The result was the Kargil War, in which over 1000 soldiers died. Sagan explains that the episode “occurred not despite Pakistan developing nuclear weapons but rather because Pakistan got the bomb.”⁴⁷ It mistakenly believed that it could use its nuclear shield to send proxies into India without triggering a war. In the second case, Iraq’s adventurism in 1990 was perhaps a result of its unconventional weapons program, used successfully in spring 1988 to force the Iranians to the bargaining table. Eisenstadt suggests that Iraq may have been emboldened by its “maturing chemical and biological weapons programs” to reassert itself. It invaded Kuwait believing that its WMD shield would deter others from intervening.⁴⁸ It is possible that nuclear Iran might likewise misinterpret the value of its nuclear shield and stumble into a costly conflict as a result.

President Obama’s fears are well-founded. Iran harbors ambitious geopolitical goals. After national survival, Iran’s primary objective is to become the most dominant state in the Middle East. In terms of international relations theory, Iran is a revisionist power. Its master national-historical narrative holds that Iran is a glorious nation with a storied past, and that it has been cheated out of its rightful place as a leading nation: Like pre-World War I Germany and China today, it is determined to reclaim its place in the sun. Currently, Iran restrains its hegemonic ambitions because it is wary of U.S. or Israeli military responses—particularly the former.

But if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, its adversaries would be forced to treat it with deference if not kid gloves, even in the face of provocative acts. Iran would achieve a degree of “inverted deterrence” against stronger states by inherently raising the stakes of any military conflict against it to the nuclear level.¹¹ As such, nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a cover under which to implement its regional ambitions with diminished fear of a U.S. military reprisal. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up its support for terrorist and proxy groups attacking Israeli, Saudi and U.S. interests in the greater Middle East and around the world; increase the harassment of and attacks against naval and commercial vessels in and near the Persian Gulf; and be more aggressive in its coercive diplomacy, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to intimidate adversaries and harmless, weaker neighbors alike.