Military option could resolve Iranian nuclear crisis

In 1981, Israel sought to one-up the World War II template by striking the critical linchpin to Saddam Hussein’s suspect program, the Osirak reactor. The Israelis believed that would end the nuclear threat. The attack came after a slew of other efforts — diplomatic demarches, public relations assassination and sabotage — collectively failed to halt construction of the French-engineered plant. The flawless airstrike destroyed the reactor — and with it Baghdad’s source for nuclear weapons plutonium. But it did not end Iraq’s weapons ambitions. In the decade that followed, Iraq dramatically increased nuclear funding and personnel. Baghdad turned away from the plutonium to a concealed uranium path to the bomb. It explored multiple enrichment technologies — but the lack of scientific expertise, advanced technology and sophisticated management led to labored progress. All the while, however, Iraqi officials feigned fidelity to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Then the 1991 Persian Gulf War blew away this facade. U.S. aircraft hit numerous industrial and suspect targets in Iraq, including locations that harbored much of the secret atomic venture. It was only after the war, however, that the international community realized the program’s scope — uncovering some 40 nuclear facilities that housed three enrichment programs, as well as a plutonium separation facility. Investigators destroyed all suspect sites and carted off all nuclear material by 1994. The effort was not easy. It had to overcome the continued hostility of Iraqi officials and efforts to hide and deceive. But, in the end, the inspectors got the job done. Iraq had no nuclear infrastructure when the United States invaded in 2003.

As Iraq showed, only inspectors on the ground, who are able to interrogate scientists, retrieve records and destroy and remove nuclear remnants, can complete the job of nuclear disarmament. Policymakers would do well to adopt the template relying for guidance on the Security Council’s 1991 authorization resolution. Key elements required Baghdad to unconditionally surrender nuclear weapons, material and technology to IAEA custody for removal — rendering harmless any remnants, while keeping inspectors on the ground to assure compliance and prevent reconstruction. Were Washington and its allies to publish their intent to rely on these principles, this would put Iran on notice that any ideas that it could absorb a military strike and rebuild the nuclear enterprise will come to naught. This could add strong leverage to our continuing efforts to get Iran to halt its suspect nuclear activities.

Does this mean that our only option is war? Yes, although an air campaign targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would entail less need for boots on the ground than the war Obama is waging against the Islamic State, which poses far smaller a threat than Iran does.

Wouldn’t an attack cause ordinary Iranians to rally behind the regime? Perhaps, but military losses have also served to undermine regimes, including the Greek and Argentine juntas, the Russian czar and the Russian communists.

Wouldn’t destroying much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure merely delay its progress? Perhaps, but we can strike as often as necessary. Of course, Iran would try to conceal and defend the elements of its nuclear program, so we might have to find new ways to discover and attack them. Surely the United States could best Iran in such a technological race.

Much the same may be said in reply to objections that airstrikes might not reach all the important facilities and that Iran would then proceed unconstrained by inspections and agreements. The United States would have to make clear that it will hit wherever and whenever necessary to stop Iran’s program. Objections that Iran might conceal its program so brilliantly that it could progress undetected all the way to a bomb apply equally to any negotiated deal with Iran.

And finally, wouldn’t Iran retaliate by using its own forces or proxies to attack Americans — as it has done in Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia — with new ferocity? Probably. We could attempt to deter this by warning that we would respond by targeting other military and infrastructure facilities.

Obama’s stance implies that we have no choice but to accept Iran’s best offer — whatever is, to use Rice’s term, “achievable” — because the alternative is unthinkable.

But should it be? What if force is the only way to block Iran from gaining nuclear weapons? That, in fact, is probably the reality. Ideology is the raison d’etre of Iran’s regime, legitimating its rule and inspiring its leaders and their supporters. In this sense, it is akin to communist, fascist and Nazi regimes that set out to transform the world. Iran aims to carry its Islamic revolution across the Middle East and beyond. A nuclear arsenal, even if it is only brandished, would vastly enhance Iran’s power to achieve that goal.

Such visionary regimes do not trade power for a mess of foreign goods. Materialism is not their priority: They often sacrifice prosperity to adhere to ideology. Of course, they need some wealth to underwrite their power, but only a limited amount. North Korea has remained dirt poor practicing its ideology of juche, or self-reliance, but it still found the resources to build nuclear weapons.

Sanctions may have induced Iran to enter negotiations, but they have not persuaded it to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons. Nor would the stiffer sanctions that Netanyahu advocates bring a different result. Sanctions could succeed if they caused the regime to fall; the end of communism in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and of apartheid in South Africa, led to the abandonment of nuclear weapons in those states. But since 2009, there have been few signs of rebellion in Tehran.