Military option would not resolve Iranian nuclear issue

When discussing Iran, President George W. Bush commonly insists that "all options are on the table" -- a not-so-subtle reminder that Washington might use force against Tehran if all else fails. This threat overlooks the fact that the United States has no realistic military option against Iran. To protect its nuclear facilities from possible U.S. strikes, Iran has dispersed them throughout the country and placed them deep underground. Any U.S. attack would thus have to overcome both intelligence-related challenges (how to find the sites) and thorny logistical ones (how to hit them). (As the Iraq debacle has shown, U.S. intelligence is not always as reliable as it should be.) And even a successful military attack would not end the mullahs' nuclear ambitions; it would only motivate them to rebuild the destroyed facilities, and to do so with even less regard for Iran's treaty obligations.

If Iran's nuclear facilities were severely damaged during an attack, it is possible that Iran could embark on a crash programme to make one nuclear weapon. In the aftermath of an attack, it is likely that popular support for an Iranian nuclear weapon capability would increase; bolstering the position of hardliners and strengthening arguments that Iran must possess a nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, Iran has threatened to withdraw from the NPT and, should it do so post-attack, would build a clandestine programme free of international inspection and control.In the aftermath of an attack, following a political decision to change the nature of the nuclear programme to construct a bomb as quickly as possible, Iran could:

1. Used stored, fresh nuclear fuel to produce HEU in a small centrifuge facility to fabricate a weapon.
2. Chemically remove plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel elements - from the Bushehr or Arak reactors, if either were operational - and use it to fabricate a nuclear weapon.
3. Assemble new centrifuges and produce highly enriched uranium (HEU). Some centrifuges might survive a military attack, but it is conceivable that Iran has stored additional centrifuges in secure locations.

This process would be hastened if Iran had a secret supply of uranium hexafluoride or if it had constructed a small primitive reactor, fuelled with natural uranium, to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. It is also possible that, post-attack, Iran could purchase additional needed materials from sympathetic states or on the black-market.

It has been estimated by some that military strikes could set back Iran's nuclear programme by two or three years or, optimistically, destroy it altogether.37 There are several reasons to dispute this. As discussed above, a military attack on Iran's nuclear facilities could kill a number of nuclear scientists and engineers, and may be designed partly to do just that, but it is very unlikely to destroy Iran's nuclear knowledge base completely. In time, surviving scientists would be able to repair damage done to nuclear facilities, or rebuild them completely, and resume the nuclear programme.Furthermore, it is to be expected that the Iranian population, including the scientific community, would unite around the current government and support any subsequent moves to attain a nuclear weapon for deterrent purposes. If Iran stood by threats to withdraw from the NPT, putting an end to IAEA inspections, there would be little prospect of international or domestic containment. Added to this, Iran is in the strong position of having the raw materials needed to resume a nuclear weapons programme.It is conceivable that, if the Iranian regime took the political decision to change the nature of its nuclear programme and embark on a crash nuclear programme, i.e. committing itself fully to building a nuclear weapon in the aftermath of an attack - using all available assets, including damaged nuclear equipment and materials, and purchasing additional supplies on the black-market - it could achieve this in less than two or three years.

Harden, or place deep underground, as much of the nuclear research and production equipment, as possible. Much of the technology needed to separate plutonium or to enrich uranium (e.g., centrifuge enrichment cascades) is complex and sensitive, and requires a fair amount of space and special handling capabilities. If this equipment can be placed in hardened or underground facilities, it will be much more difficult for the United States or other nations to hold it at risk. Similarly, if the program is dispersed to multiple sites around the country and undertaken at remote, nondescript facilities that are protected by a layered air-defense system, it greatly complicates the intelligence problem of identifying where fissile material or weapons are being produced and stored. It also reduces the likelihood of an attack - or at least, a successful attack - such as the one that the Israelis conducted in June 1981 against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq. There is strong, tangible evidence that Iran has been pursuing these tactics, including a report from the IAEA indicating that parts of the Iranian nuclear R&D program were being undertaken in hardened, underground facilities, and in other facilities that had been kept entirely secret from IAEA inspectors - in some cases for as long as 18 years.